On 14 November 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council imposed new sanctions on Iran and said that it would be willing to continue to target those countries providing arms and military support to Russia.

As increasing evidence emerges that Iran is supplying military equipment to Russia (most notably drones), there is a need to better target sanctions and implement policies that restrict Iran’s ability to operate with external actors.

Particular attention must be paid to Iran’s relations with third countries and the opportunities that these provide for Iran to circumvent international sanctions and evade external scrutiny.

Iran’s military partnership with the state-owned Venezuelan Company of Military Industries (CAVIM) and the opening of an Iranian drone factory in Tajikistan stand as two clear examples of this phenomenon.

• Will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) conduct a comprehensive investigation into Iran’s relations with third countries and how these are instrumentalised to support Iran’s military aims at home and abroad?
• Will the VP/HR propose sanctions against CAVIM in line with the United States’ decision of 2013?
• Will the VP/HR engage with the Tajik authorities to establish the exact operations and international footprint of the Iranian drone factory that has been active in Dushanbe since May 2022?

See the answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles on behalf of the European Commission